though, and renders necessary a preliminary study of the specific concept of history in which it currently takes place.
If the Anthropocene acquires the status of a true geological epoch, it is obvious that such an epoch will determine the historical representation as well as the social and political meaning of the events occurring in it. In other words, this new geological era will not and cannot have the neutrality and asubjectivity characteristic of geological eras in general. The Anthropocene situates the human being itself between nature and history. On the one hand, it is still of course the subject of its own history, responsible, and con scious. Consciousness of history, or "historicity," is not separable from his tory itself. It entails memory, capacity to change, and, precisely, responsibil ity. On the other hand, though, the human of the Anthropocene, defined as a geological force, must be seen as neutral and indifferent, as a geological reality itself. The two sides of this new identity cannot mirror each other, causing a break in reflexivity.
The awareness of the Anthropocene, then, originates through an inter ruption of consciousness. Such is the problem. I intend to ask whether such an interruption opens the space for a substitution of the brain for conscious ness. I proceed to a confrontation between two different points of view on this question. According to the first, the Anthropocene forces us to consider the human as a geological agent pure and simple. Such is Dipesh Chakra barty's position. I refer to his two now famous articles (Chakrabarty 2009 (Chakrabarty , 2012 . According to the second, understanding the Anthropocene necessar ily privileges the role of the brain and thus biology. This is the approach Dan iel Lord Smail takes in his On Deep History and the Brain (2008) . I show how their two approaches may be seen as complementing each other and intro duce in the debate, as a medium term and under a new form, some impor tant and unjustly forgotten elements brought to light by some prominent French historians from the École des Annales-like those of "mentality" and "slow" or "long term" temporality.
Chakrabarty denies any metaphorical understanding of the "geologi cal." If the human has become a geological form, there has to exist some where, at a certain level, an isomorphy, or structural sameness, between humanity and geology. This isomorphy is what emerges-at least in the form of a question-when consciousness, precisely, gets interrupted by this very fact. Human subjectivity, as geologized, so to speak, is broken into at least two parts, revealing the split between an agent endowed with free will and the capacity to selfreflect and a neutral inorganic power, which para lyzes the energy of the former. Once again, we are not facing the dichotomy between the historical and the biological; we are not dealing with the rela tionship between man understood as a living being and man understood as a subject.
Man cannot appear to itself as a geological force, because being a geo logical force is a mode of disappearance. Therefore, the becoming force of the human is beyond any phenomenology and has no ontological status. Human subjectivity is in a sense reduced to atoms without any atomic inten tion and has become structurally alien, by want of reflexivity, to its own apocalypse.
A major common point between Chakrabarty and Smail is the neces sity to consider that history does not start with recorded history, but has to be envisaged as deep history. As Chakrabarty (2009: 213) suggests, "Spe cies thinking . . . is connected to the enterprise of deep history." Let's recall the definition of deep history proposed by Edward Wilson (1996: ix-x) , to whom both Chakrabarty and Smail refer: "Human behavior is seen as the product not just of recorded history, ten thousand years recent, but of deep history, the combined genetic and cultural changes that created humanity over hundreds of [thousands of] years."
According to Chakrabarty, however, biological "deep past" is certainly not deep enough. In that sense, therefore, a "neurohistorical" approach to the Anthropocene remains insufficient. Neurocentrism is just another ver sion of anthropocentrism. Focusing on the biological only, Smail would miss the geological dimension of the human: "Smail's book pursues possi ble connections between biology and culture-between the history of the human brain and cultural history, in particular-while being always sensi tive to the limits of biological reasoning. But it is the history of human biol ogy and not any recent theses about the newly acquired geological agency of humans that concerns Smail" (Chakrabarty 2009: 206) . The human's recent status as geological agent paradoxically draws the historian back to a very ancient past, a time when the human itself did not exist-a time that thus exceeds "prehistory."
One will immediately argue that Smail, in his book, is precisely under taking a deconstruction of the concept of prehistory. Clearly, the notion of deep history represents for him the result of such a deconstruction. Deep history, then, substitutes itself for prehistory. According to the usual view, history starts with the rise of civilization and departs from a "buffer zone" between biological evolution and history proper-such a buffer zone is what precisely is called prehistory. If history must be understood, as Wilson sug gests, as the originary intimate interaction between the genetic and the cultural, it starts with the beginning of hominization and does not require the "pre" (Smail 2008 ).
Smail's approach is clearly an epigenetic one, which forbids the assimi lation of "hominization" with the history of consciousness. Epigenetics is a branch of molecular biology that studies the mechanisms that modify the function of genes by activating or deactivating them without altering the DNA sequence in the formation of the phenotype. Epigenetic modifications depend on two types of causes: internal and structural, on the one hand, and environmental, on the other. In the first case, it is a matter of the physical and chemical mechanisms (RNA, nucleosome, methylation) . In the second, epi genetics supplies genetic material with a means of reacting to the evolution of environmental conditions. The definition of phenotypical malleability proposed by the American biologist Mary Jane WestEberhard (2003: 34) is eloquent in this respect: it is a matter of the "ability of an organism to react to an environmental input with a change in form, state, movement, or rate of activity." Contemporary epigenetics reintroduces the development of the individual into the heart of evolution, opening a new theoretical space called "evolutionary developmental biology," or "evodevo."
Lambros Malafouris, in his book How Things Shape the Mind: A Theory of Material Engagement, shows how epigenetics has modified the usual view of cognitive development, thus constituting cognitive archeology a major field in historical studies. "Cognitive development," he writes, is explained as the emergent product . . . of these constraints [from genes and the individual cell to the physical and social environment]. In this con text, the view of brain and cognitive development known as probabilistic epigenesis . . . which emphasizes the interactions between experience and gene expression . . . is of special interest. The unidirectional formula (prevalent in molecular biology) by which genes drive and determine behavior is replaced with a new scheme that explicitly recognizes the bidirectionality of influ ences between the genetic, behavioral, environmental, and sociocultural levels of analysis." (Malafouris 2013: 40) This new scheme requires, as Malafouris brilliantly shows, a material ist approach of the interaction between the biological and the cultural. Hence the subtitle of the book: A Theory of Material Engagement. The epigenetic crossing and interaction in question take place through things, through matter, which is also to say, through the inorganic. It is a "nonrepresentative" vision of interaction, which requires no subjectobject relationship, no mind seeing in advance what has to be made or fabricated. Mind, brain, behavior, and the cre ated object happen together; all are part of the same process. "The cognitive life of things is not exhausted by their possible causal role in shaping some aspect of human intelligent behavior; the cognitive life of things also embod ies a crucial enactive and constitutive role" (Malafouris 2013: 44) . Therefore, to explore the relationships between the brain and its "environment" is a much wider and deeper task than to study the role of the "human" in its "milieu," precisely because it lays the foundation, for an essential part, on a nonhuman materiality and cannot be limited to a biological form of inquiry. In that sense, ecology to come acquires a new meaning: "This new ecology cannot be reduced to any of its constitutive elements (biological or artificial) and thus cannot be accounted for by looking at the isolated properties of per sons or things. The challenge for archaeology, in this respect, is to reveal and articulate the variety of forms that cognitive extension can take and the diver sity of feedback relationships between objects and the embodied brain as they become realized in different periods and cultural settings" (82). Malafouris then argues that this ecology should be understood as a result of the "embed ment" of the human brain. "The term 'embedment,'" Malafouris (2010: 52) writes, "derives from the fusion of the terms 'embodiment'-referring to the intrinsic relationship between brain and body-and 'embeddedness'-describing the intrinsic relationship between brain/body and environment."
To conclude on that point and go back to our initial discussion, we can see that Smail's and Malafouris's approaches to the brain/environment rela tionship are not "strictly" biological but include, as a central element, the inorganic materiality of things. As Smail (2008: 48) declares: "The great his torical disciplines, including geology, evolutionary biology and ethology, archeology, historical linguistics, and cosmology, all rely on evidence that has been extracted from things. Lumps of rocks, fossils, mitochondrial DNA, isotopes, behavioral patterns, potsherds, phonemes: all these things encode information about the past." "History is something," he continues, "that happens to people, things, organisms, and is not made by them" (57). Deep history, conjoined with archeology of the mind, or "neuroarcheology," would then extend the limits of the "brain" well beyond reflexivity and con sciousness, well beyond "historicity" as well. As archeological, the brain/ environment relationship is already also geological. It remains clear, though, that Chakrabarty would not be entirely convinced by such an argument. Even if nonanthropocentric, even if thing and inorganicmatteroriented, even if including at its core a neutral, areflexive, nonrepresentative type of interaction as well as cognitive assemblages, the conjoined point of view of deep history and archeology of the mind still takes the "human" as a point of departure. The process of hominization is of course inseparable from an evo lutionary perspective. Chakrabarty's perspective is very close to that of French philosopher Quentin Meillassoux in his book After Finitude. Meillas soux argues for a "noncorrelationist" approach to the "real," which would not lay foundation on the subjectobject relationship at all and would totally elude the presence of the human on earth as a point of departure. There exists a mode of exploration of deep past (of the extremely deep past) that does not even consider the emergence of life in general as a "beginning." Deep past, then, becomes an "ancestrality" devoid of any "ancestors": "I will call 'ancestral, '" Meillassoux (2008: 10) writes, "any reality anterior to the emergence of the human species-or even anterior to every recognized form of life on earth." The archive, here, is not the object, not even the thing, not even the fossil, but what Meillassoux calls the arche-fossil:
I will call "archefossil" or "fossilmatter" not just materials indicating the traces of past life, according to the familiar sense of the term "fossil," but materials indicating the existence of an ancestral reality or event; one that is anterior to terrestrial life. An archefossil thus designates the material sup port on the basis of which the experiments that yield estimates of ancestral phenomena proceed-for example, an isotope whose rate of radioactive decay we know, or the luminous emission of a star that informs us as to the date of its formation. (10) For Meillassoux, the earth is entirely indifferent to our existence, anterior to any form of human presence-be it neural, be it neutral.
Again, these affirmations resonate with Chakrabarty's claim that the notion of the "geological," in the term geological agent, forever remains out side human experience. "How does a social historian go about writing a human history of an uninhabited and uninhabitable vast expanse of snow and ice?" he asks when talking about the Antarctic (Chakrabarty 2012: 11) . A decorrelated subject cannot access itself as decorrelated. "We cannot ever experience ourselves as a geophysical force-though we now know that this is one of the modes of our collective existence" (12). Chakrabarty's analysis adds an important element to Meillassoux's thesis when it takes into account the experience of the impossibility to experience decorrelationism. We can conceptualize it but not experience it.
Who is the we? We humans never experience ourselves as a species. We can only intellectually comprehend or infer the existence of the human species but never experience it as such. There could be no phenomenology of us as a species. Even if we were to emotionally identify with a word like mankind, we would not know what being a species is, for, in species history, humans are only an instance of the concept species as indeed would be any other life form. But one never experiences being a concept. (Chakrabarty 2009: 220) At this point, a major issue appears, relaunching the discussion and a return to Smail's analysis. First, we do not see what a species can be outside the biological point of view. Why keep that term? Second, I do not understand why the fact of becoming a geological form would have to remain entirely conceptual, without producing a kind of mental phenomenon. "Climate scien tists' history reminds us . . . that we now also have a mode of existence in which we-collectively and as a geophysical force and in ways we cannot experience ourselves-are 'indifferent' or 'neutral' (I do not mean these as mental or experienced states) to questions of intrahuman justice" (Chakrabarty 2012: 14 ; emphasis mine). Before coming to the political consequences of such a statement, I would like to ask why precisely we could not be suscepti ble to experience mentally and psychically the indifference and neutrality that have become part of our nature. Deprived of any empiricality, mental or psy chic effects, the assumption of the human as a geological force remains a pure abstract argument, and, in that sense, it appears as an ontological or metaphysical structure. Just like Meillassoux, Chakrabarty ends up failing to empiricize the very structure that is supposed to detranscendentalize, so to speak, the empirical. Why should there be any intermediary locus of experi ence between consciousness and the suspension of consciousness? This is where the brain demands recognition! Is not the brain, on which Chakrabarty remains silent, an essential intermediary between the historical, the biological, and the geological? That site of experience we are looking for?
This brings us back to Smail and to one of the most important and interest ing aspects of his analysis, the theory of addiction. Smail insists that the con stant interaction between the brain and the environment is essentially based on brainbody state alterations. The brain maintains itself in its changing environment by becoming addicted to it, understanding "addiction" in the proper sense as a "psychotropy," a significant transformation or alteration of the psyche. These altering effects result from the action of neurotransmit ters "such as testosterone and other androgens, estrogen, serotonin, dopa mine, endorphins, oxytocin, prolactin, vasopressin, epinephrine, and so on.
Produced in glands and synapses throughout the body, these chemicals facilitate or block the signals passing along neural pathways" (Smail 2008: 113) . Such chemicals, which determine emotions, feelings, and affects in general, can be modulated according to the demands of the behavioral adap tation they make possible. Adaptation, here, is twosided. It is of course adap tation to the external world, but it is also the adaptation of the brain to its own modifications.
All important changes in deep history, like the passage of one age to another, have always produced new addictive processes and chemical bodily state modulations:
A neurohistorical model offers an equally grand explanatory paradigm, pro posing that some of the direction we detect in recent history has been cre ated by ongoing experiments with new psychotropic mechanisms that themselves evolved against the evolutionary backdrop of human neurophys iology. The Neolithic revolution between 10,000 and 5,000 years ago trans formed human ecology and led to fundamental and irreversible changes in demographics, politics, society, and economies. In this changing ecology, new mechanisms for modulating body states emerged through processes of undirected cultural evolution. (187) We have to understand that the expansion in calories available for human consumption, the domestica tion of animals useful as sources of energy, the practice of sedentism, the growing density of human settlements-such were the changes character istic of the Neolithic revolution in all parts of the world where agriculture was independently invented: Mesopotamia, Africa, China, Mesoamerica, and other sites. All these changes created, in effect, a new neurophysiologi cal ecosystem, a field of evolutionary adaptation in which the sorts of cus toms and habits that generate new neural configurations or alter brainbody states could evolve in unpredictable ways. (155) From this, Smail concludes, "Civilization did not bring an end to biol ogy" (155). Again, deep history reveals the profound interaction of nature and history through the mediation of the brain as both a biological and cultural adaptor. Human practices alter or affect brainbody chemistry, and, in return, brainbody chemistry alters or affects human practices. Brain epigenetic power acts as a medium between its deep past and the environment.
"The moodaltering practices, behaviors, and institutions generated by human culture are what I refer to, collectively, as psychotropic mechanisms," Smail explains. "Psychotropic is a strong word but not wholly inapt, for these mechanisms have neurochemical effects that are not all that dissimilar from those produced by the drugs normally called psychotropic or psychoactive" (161). Further, "Psychotropy comes in different forms: things we do that shape the moods of others; things we do to ourselves; things we ingest" (164).
We can distinguish here between autotropic and allotropic psychotro pic, that is, addictive substances and practices acting on the self, and addic tive practices acting on the other political addictive practices. Among the former are "coffee, sugar, chocolate, and tobacco" (179), which first began circulating in Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. "All of these products have mildly addictive or moodaltering properties" (179). To these alcohol and drugs will later be added.
Smail recalls that the current meaning of the term addiction emerged in the late seventeenth century. "Earlier, the word had implied the state of being bound or indebted to a person-to a lord, for example, or perhaps to the devil" (183). This old meaning helps us understand what constitutes allotropy. Psychotropic addictive chemical mechanisms can also be induced in subjects out of power excess and abuse of domination. Stress and more general affec tive states of dependence, what Baruch Spinoza calls "sad passions," are essential aspects of psychotropy, caused in contexts of dominance. The cross ing point between modularity and change coincides precisely with the cross ing point between biology and politics: "Humans possess relatively plastic or manipulable neural states and brainbody chemistries," such that "moods, emotions, and predispositions inherited from the ancestral past" can be "vio lated, manipulated, or modulated" (Smail 2008: 117) .
According to Smail, autotropic and allotropic addictive processes auto matically mark the point of indiscernibility between biology (chemical sub stances and mechanisms) and culture (beingintheworld). We find again the idea that the brain is the mediator between the two dimensions of (deep) history: the natural and the historical.
How can we extend these remarks to the current situation? First, they lead us to admit that only new addictions will help us to lessen the effects of climate change (eating differently, traveling differently, dressing differently, etc.). Addictive processes have in large part caused the Anthropocene, and only new addictions will be able to partly counter them. Second, they force us to elaborate a renewed concept of the addicted subject, of suspended con sciousness and intermittent freedom. Third, they allow us to argue that the neutrality Chakrabarty speaks of is not conceivable outside of a new psycho tropy, a mental and psychic experience of the disaffection of experience. Such a psychotropy would precisely fill the gap between the transcendental struc ture of the geological dimension of the human and the practical disaffection of historical reflexivity. The subject of the Anthropocene cannot but become addicted to its own indifference-addicted to the concept it has become. And that happens in the brain.
The motif of a narcolepsy of consciousness, as both cause and effect of the technological destruction of nature, had already been interestingly and importantly suggested by Marshall McLuhan. His analysis seems to fit the framework of the current ecological crisis perfectly. Technological develop ment coincides for him with an extension of the nervous system to the very limits of the world: "After three thousand years of explosion, by means of fragmentary and mechanical technologies," he writes, "the Western world is imploding. During the mechanical ages we had extended our bodies in space. Today, after more than a century of electric technology, we have extended our central nervous system itself in a global embrace, abolishing both space and time as far as our planet is concerned" (McLuhan [1964] 1990: 52). The extension of the nervous system to the world has a double contradictory effect, acting as a pain killer (a "counterirritant") to the extent that it suppresses all alterity and, at the same time and for the same reason, acting as a destructive power. Such is the structure of our "narcotic culture." Every technological device is a prolongation of the brain and the organism, and McLuhan characterizes this prolongation as a process of "autoamputa tion" that helps lower the pressure and creates anxiety, thus putting at work an economy of pleasure as "numbness."
One might argue that the world about which McLuhan talks, the world to which the nervous system extends its frontiers is an image, a reflecting surface, whereas the split Chakrabarty analyzes as the separation between the human as a historical agent and the human as a geological force con fronts two heterogeneous entities that cannot reflect each other at all. Never theless, if we look closely at what McLuhan says about mirroring, narcis sism, and the projection of one's own image, we see that reflection is for him immediately suspended by a spontaneous petrification, a geologization of both the gaze and the image. On the myth of Narcissus, McLuhan writes ([1964] 1990: 53): "As counterirritant, the image produces a generalized numbness or shock that declines recognition. Selfamputation forbids self recognition." Indifference and neutrality, once again, can be mental phe nomena, even when their manifestations may seem totally alien to any men tal or internalizing structure. Again, I do not think that the neutralization of consciousness due to its "geologization" can happen without the intermedi ary of brain processes resulting from its interaction with the world. Indeed, I have tried to show elsewhere that indifference has become the global cur rent Stimmung, that is, atunement or affect (Malabou 2012) .
Such an indifference, this interruption of consciousness or awareness, directly challenges the concept of responsibility, which is of course central in our debate. How can we feel genuinely responsible for what we have done to the earth if such a deed is the result of an addicted and addictive slumber of responsibility itself? It seems impossible to produce a genuine awareness of addiction (awareness of addiction is always an addicted form of awareness). Only the setting of new addictions can help in breaking old ones. Ecology has to become a new libidinal economy.
These are some of the issues that political discourses on climate change, as demonstrated at conferences like the recent twentyfirst session of the Conference of the Parties (COP21) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in Paris, do not genuinely take into account. Most of the time, the official ecological discourse is still only a discourse on awareness and responsibility. That of course does not mean that the human is not responsible for global warming. Nevertheless, the type of responsibil ity requested by the Anthropocene is extremely paradoxical and difficult to the extent that it implies the acknowledgment of an essential paralysis of responsibility.
Chakrabarty would no doubt argue that these last developments remain caught in the correlationist frame. They would still be human, all too human. Do they not let aside the issue of nature as such to only take into account humanity's technoscientific power and its psychotropic causes and consequences?
The traditional concept of history, Chakrabarty writes, implies a dis avowal of the fact that nature can have a history. It presupposes a strict border between pure contingent facts (natural ones) and events understood as acts of agents. Benedetto Croce, for example, claims that "there is no world but the human world" (Chakrabarty 2009: 203) . French historian Fernand Braudel, in his book The Mediterranean and the Ancient World (2001), of course rebelled against such a vision by taking into account the specific temporality of the Mediterranean natural environment, the soil, the biosphere, and so on. Never theless, this time of nature is still seen as purely repetitive and mechanical, deprived of any agency or eventual power; it "is a history of constant repetition, everrecurring cycles" (Chakrabarty 2009: 204) . Such a contention is not sus tainable any longer, because the age of the Anthropocene teaches something already widespread in the "literature of global warming": "The overall environ ment can sometimes reach a tipping point at which this slow and apparently timeless backdrop for human actions transforms itself with a speed that can only spell disaster for human beings" (Chakrabarty 2009: 205) .
How do we respond to this? It is obvious that Braudel has not thematized or even perceived the historicity of nature, its mutability and ability to trans form itself. In The Mediterranean and the Ancient World (Braudel 2001) , the analysis of climate is definitely poor, as Braudel does not say a word, or at least nothing significant, about ecology. In that sense, Chakrabarty is right to challenge the cyclical vision of natural time that still governs Braudel's notion of nature's time and space. It seems to me, though, that Chakrabarty does not see how helpful Braudel nevertheless can be for our discussion. It is true that what Braudel calls the "geohistorical time," the archaic natural time, does not change. The "very long term" time, made of thousands of years, geological time proper, seems to be deprived of any capacity to trans form itself. But it is striking to note that the two other levels Braudel distin guishes, that of economic and social time (middle term duration) and that of the event (short term temporality), are also contaminated by the first level's immobility. And here is the interesting point. Braudel has perhaps failed to take into account the historical force of nature, but he certainly very early and accurately perceived the irrevocable naturalization of human history, that is, of economic, political, and social time. He described better than anyone else the narcolepsy of historical temporality, to such a point that he was accused of depoliticizing it.
Deconstructing the privilege of the event, Braudel showed that a geo logical principle, that of a blind slowing force, was operating at all layers of time. In that sense, he anticipated something from the current situation, to the extent that he announced that historical consciousness had to acknowl edge its own naturalization and suspension by entering the reign of immo bility. In that sense, what Chakrabarty sees as a consequence (the human transformed into a geological force because of climate change and the entry into the Anthropocene), Braudel saw as a beginning (history has always already slowed down, thus preparing itself for its own neutralization by nature). What Braudel said about capitalism is extremely interesting in this respect. He argued that material life progresses by means of "slow evolu tions." Advances occur "very slowly over long periods by the initiative of groups of men, not individuals . . . , and in countless varied and obscure ways" (Braudel 1973: 258) . Great technical revolutions infiltrate society "slowly and with difficulty . . . to speak of revolution here is to use a figure of speech. Nothing took place at breakneck speed" (442).
One might object again that long term temporality presupposes an essential passivity and unchangeability of nature, that it cannot account for a sudden constitution of nature itself as a historical acting agent, like the one we are currently witnessing with the Anthropocene. That is true. But the problem, as we have seen all along, is that approaching the historical force of nature paradoxically leads us to slow down, to face the suspension of con sciousness, the numbness and slumber of our responsibility. It is in a certain sense like exchanging roles, nature becoming historical and the anthropos becoming natural. This exchange constitutes a new form of human experi ence, and this Braudel helps us to conceptualize.
The third generation of the Annales School in France-Marc Ferro, Jacques Le Goff, and Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie-still increased the part played by the very long term temporality. As one of them declares: "Time is fully human, and yet, it is as motionless as geographic evolution" (Dosse quoting Aries 1987: 165) . 1 Braudel's work found itself extended and prolon gated by the introduction of an important concept that emerged at that time in historical science, that of "mentality," closer to the psychological than to the intellectual. The acknowledgment of slow time, or long term time, gave way to a "history of mentalities" (histoire des mentalités). Based on "material culture," that is, on the similarities between the mind's rhythms and natural cycles, history of mentalities provided its readers with descriptions and anal yses of uses, repetitions, habits, and representations. Philippe Aries (1981) declared that the history of mentalities situated itself "at the crossing point between the biological and the social" (quoted in Dosse 1987: 198) .
As we already noticed, this crossing point between the biological and the social does not mean that the biological must be taken as a point of depar ture or that the human as a living being should become the origin of histori cal research. The history of mentality also includes, as one of essential dimen sion, the materiality of inorganic nature, the soil, the rocks, the mountains, the rivers, the earth. A mentality is a hybrid concept that comprehends not only the psychic and the social but also the originary likeliness of the mind and the fossil, the inscription of naturality in thought and behavior. Mental ity, in that sense, is rooted in the brain and not in consciousness. "The human reduced to its 'mental' is the object rather than the subject of its own history" ("L'homme réduit à son mental est objet de son histoire plutôt que sujet") (Dosse 1987: 206) . Jean Delumeau (1990) Dosse 1987: 206) . As a consequence of all previous analyses, we may consider history of mentalities to be the first form of environmental studies in France. Could it be that new histories of mentalities, which would bring together the geological, biological, and cultural current dimensions of historical (non) awareness, may open a new chapter of Anthropocenic study?
What seems to me challengeable in Chakrabarty's work is the claim of an impossibility to phenomenalize the geological becoming of the human. This "species" the human remains a pure void concept until it can be filled with intuition, that is, with empirical and sensuous content, if not with aware ness. A renewed and reelaborated concept of mentality might precisely help provide the missing content of this form. There necessarily exists a mental effect of the numbness and paralysis of consciousness, a mental effect of the new narcoleptic structure of humanity's (impossible) reflection on itself. We have seen, with Smail and McLuhan, that this mental effect was a neural one in the first place. Again, it is not a matter of thinking the brain "in" its environment; it's a matter of seeing the brain as an environment, as a meta bolic place. Therefore, I prefer using the term mental rather than neural, because mental immediately evokes the merging and mingling of different registers of materialities. In that sense, getting accustomed to the new condi tion of the human as a geological agent will of course require a new mental ity, that is, new addictions, new bodily adaptations to an inorganic and earthly corporeity, a new natural history. A history, still, nevertheless.
Reading Braudel and his followers helps us perceive that the narco lepsy of consciousness constitutes an irreducible dimension of history. Long term temporality, immobility, and very slow evolution show that deep history has always been inscribed at the heart of history, as this numbness of time and action that submits cultural evolution to a geophysical rhythm. Braudel is perhaps not a thinker of climate change, but he is a great theoretician of a new form of Marxism that binds the critique of capital to a study of the irre ducible naturality, neutrality, and passivity of time. The critique addressed to the historians of long term duration and mentalities was the same as the ones currently addressed to Chakrabarty, all pointing, in both cases, at a sup posed depoliticization of history. François Dosse (1987: 258) wrote that with the École des Annales, in the end, "history ha[d] negated itself." He wished that "the event" might come back in order to wake up time from its geologi cal slumber. . . . He could not foresee that with the Anthropocene, long term temporality would precisely acquire the status of an event-which would free the attempt at thinking ecology and politics differently.
Note
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Unless otherwise indicated, all translations are mine.
